Bantu Philosophy endures because it spoke to Africans despite its flaws.

Evidence

Kleinhempel (2019, p.134), is right when he notes that “the book has become a classical work”. That is because, according to Kleinhempel (2019, p.134), Bantu Philosophy is “referred to in almost any book on African Philosophy”. The fact that Bantu Philosophy is consulted by almost all students of African philosophy should make us pause and ask why that should be the case. If, according to unpublished work by Janz (n.d.), Tempels was not a philosopher, and if Bantu Philosophy is not a book of academic philosophy because it makes few references to academic philosophical discourse of the time, then why do African philosophers keep referring to it? Indeed, if, according to Hountondji (1983), Bantu Philosophy is a “location of philosophy” or “ethnophilosophy”, as he calls it, why then should the book be recognized as a “classical work”? Could it be the case that this “localized philosophy” spoke to many Africans then and still speaks volumes to them today, albeit imperfectly? — Frans Dokman, Beyond Bantu Philosophy_…, 106

Categorization

• QUESTION: Why exactly does ethnophilosophy retain canonical status in African philosophy despite being contested? Worth chasing the Hountondji critique further.
• XREF: Connects to Hountondji’s critique of ethnophilosophy and the later debate over whether a single ‘Bantu philosophy’ exists.