Banks with Fed directorships were more likely to receive TARP funds

Evidence

Adams, “Who Directs the Fed?” Duchin and Sosyura (“The Politics of Government Investments”) find that banks with Fed directorships were more likely to receive TARP funds during the crisis. Someone needs to do a similar study with the Bloomberg release of Fed data on previously secret loans. Westbrook, Out of the Crisis, p. 134. — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 2083

Categorization

• XREF: Directly extends the ‘thought collective’ theme — incumbents of the regulatory body capture the benefits of the crisis response. Echoes the private-judge/reputation findings from the law-merchant readings. — connects to: The Federal Reserve acted subservient to banks while posing as a regulator — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 2082; The Fed’s COVID-era policies shifted public resources to large corporate capital holders. — Clara E. Mattei, Escape from Capitalism: An Intervention, 377; Private asset managers designed and ran government bailout programs — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 944 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• Private asset managers designed and ran government bailout programs #corroborates (0.82) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 944
• Bernanke’s Fed escaped any consequences for its failed crisis forecasting and bailouts #complicates (0.75) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 513
• The Fed’s COVID-era policies shifted public resources to large corporate capital holders. #qualifies (0.72) — Clara E. Mattei, Escape from Capitalism, 377