Banks blamed the 2008 crash on impossible statistical outlier events
Evidence
A common refrain when the crisis first hit was that no one could have seen it coming. It was the financial equivalent of the meteor that wiped out the dinosaurs. All the diversification and hedging strategies that were supposed to keep banks from blowing up were, as David Viniar, the chief financial officer of Goldman Sachs put it, blindsided by â25 standard deviation moves, several days in a row.â This is similar to the âten sigma eventâ claim reportedly made by John Meriweather when his hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), blew up in 1998. â Mark Blyth, Austerity, 103
Categorization
- XREF: The Goldman Sachs â25 sigmaâ and LTCM âten sigmaâ excuses are recurring examples in critiques of financial risk management; connects to broader austerity/blame literature. â connects to: Claiming that correlated market crises are statistically impossible is plainly false â Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a DangerousâŠ, 104; Banksâ risk models treat the past as the limit of what can happen â Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a DangerousâŠ, 109; Observed storm data contained outliers contradicting the assumed normal distribution â Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: EnvironmentalâŠ, 209
- CANDY: The âmeteor that wiped out the dinosaursâ framing for the financial crisis is quotable.
Broader Connections
- Claiming that correlated market crises are statistically impossible is plainly false
#corroborates(0.85) â Mark Blyth, Austerity, 104 - Banksâ risk models treat the past as the limit of what can happen
#expands(0.80) â Mark Blyth, Austerity, 109