Ballot-box accountability fails for decisions of great complexity and detail

Evidence

In appraising the applicability of such procedures in peacetime, or indeed of any kind of official settlement of such problems, consider the strain which would be put upon democratic political institutions if officials had to assume responsibility for determinations of this difficulty and delicacy. Think about this problem of political science more broadly also, in relation to the function and utility of private ordering generally. The theory of political democracy is that officials who exercise discretion ought to be subjected to the ultimate check of the ballot box. See pp.178-79, above. Can this check work successfully if officials are given powers of decision in matters of the sensitiveness and complexity and endless detail of those now under conuideration? β€” Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 4263

Categorization

  • DEEPTHINKING: The ballot-check theory of democracy confronts its own limit: the very intricacy of delegated decisions makes electoral accountability a fiction, connecting to when private ordering must be preferred.
  • XREF: connects to: Institutional allocation of rule-making duty depends on the type of question at stake β€” Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 4174; Prior-approval systems fail when they cannot be reduced to simple routine β€” Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 772; Congress delegates because it lacks time and expertise for detail β€” Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 478 (+3 more)

Broader Connections