Autonomy alone is insufficient and must join other justice capabilities
Evidence
Ultimately, however, PeƱa leaves autonomy, well, autonomous, tying it with localism and the privileging of local views; this seems to leave us incapable of tying autonomy with other elements in a larger view of justice. For PeƱa, in other words, autonomy is necessary and sufļ¬cient as a master frame for justice; my argument is that it is necessary, but insufļ¬cient. For both a more full claim and experience of justice, and for the connection to environmental ends, autonomy needs to be tied to a number of other capabilities. ā David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 203
Categorization
- XREF: Autonomy-insufficiency mirrors the earlier pattern (ch 19-21) where recognition alone proved insufficient; the readerās typology gains a parallel critique of mastery by any single frame. ā connects to: EJ advocates lack sufficient power to win justice struggles alone ā Luke W. Cole and Sheila R. Foster, From the Ground Up: Environmentalā¦, 723; Freedom means autonomy of choice, not success in obtaining oneās ends. ā Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay onā¦, 1154; Distributive-only justice theory fails to address recognition and capability concerns ā David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:ā¦, 415 (+1 more)
Broader Connections
- Freedom means autonomy of choice, not success in obtaining oneās ends.
#qualifies(0.80) ā Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1154 - Distributive-only justice theory fails to address recognition and capability concerns
#expands(0.78) ā David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 415 - Gaining freedom paradoxically requires relinquishing some autonomy to rules.
#complicates(0.75)