Auctions advocates shifted their crisis claims after the fact to fit their designs.

Evidence

But what did getting a “fair deal” have to do with the market designers’ theory of the crisis? At most it seemed only to address the issue of whether one could consider the price generated to be a legitimate “market” price—a matter that really could not be settled by an experiment, anyhow. This was a far different claim than the one they had originally made to the Treasury: in their initial submission, Ausubel and Cramton argued not for the aggregation ability of markets in general, but instead for a very specific kind of “clock auction.” — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 863

Categorization

• XREF: Reinforces Mirowski’s recurring theme of the economics profession retrofitting narratives after the crisis rather than revising theory. — connects to: Market designers pitched crisis auctions partly to win lucrative government contracts — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 868; Market designers claimed better auctions alone could have prevented the 2008 crisis — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 870; Market designers flipped their public stance on TARP once they lost auction contracts. — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 874

Broader Connections

• Market designers claimed better auctions alone could have prevented the 2008 crisis #exemplifies (0.90) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 870
• Market designers pitched crisis auctions partly to win lucrative government contracts #expands (0.85) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 868
• Market designers flipped their public stance on TARP once they lost auction contracts. #exemplifies (0.85) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 874