Assortative mating emerges from everyone desiring the most attractive partner
Evidence
Kalick and Hamilton (1986) used ABM to simulate the well-known empirical fact that people tend to end up with romantic partners of about equal attractiveness to themselves. Highly attractive people end up with highly attractive people, moderately attractive people end up with moderately attractive people, and so on. A common explanation for this fact was that people actively seek partners with similar levels of attractiveness, presumably due to the fear of being rejected by more attractive prospects (e.g., Berscheid, Dion, Walster, & Walster, 1971) or from a general preference for similarity in all attributes. However, repeated studies found no support for the proposed similarity preference. Instead, all people demonstrate a strong preference for the most attractive potential partners (e.g., Curran & Lippold, 1975). Kalick and Hamilton sought to resolve this paradox via ABM. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 825
Categorization
Category: Contrarian or Surprising Claims
- QUESTION: How did Kalick and Hamilton’s simulation resolve the paradox — what mechanism produced matching from uniform preference for the most attractive?
- XREF: The assembled-equilibrium-where-no-one-desires-it pattern parallels Schelling segregation; also reminiscent of market-matching dynamics in Diamond and Diamond bourse trust material.