Asian assertiveness stems from economics while Muslim assertiveness stems from demographics

Evidence

While Chinese and Japanese found new value in their own cultures, they also shared in a broader reassertion of the value of Asian culture generally compared to that of the West. Industrialization and the growth that accompanied it produced in the 1980s and 1990s articulation by East Asians of what may be appropriately termed the Asian affirmation. — Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the…, 291 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Among the earlier writers in this period of growing European domination, two themes predominate, both of them developments of themes already perceptible in earlier writings. They are respectively the military and the political. The one began as a concern with Western weapons, then with Western methods of war­ fare. This in turn developed into a concern with Western technology and even­ tually industry, as the realization spread that it was to no small extent on these that the superiority of Western armies depended. In the course of the nineteenth century, Muslim awareness of economic inferiority began to equal their awareness of the more dramatic and more obvious political and military weakness of the Islamic world, and some Muslim rulers began to be concerned with economic development along Western lines, not just as a support for better armies and navies, but for its own sake. — Bernard Lewis, From Babel to Dragomans, 1096 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Sheehi argues that Middle Eastern (both Arab and Iranian) and South Asian Muslims, who make up 45 percent of American Muslims, are overwhelmingly upper-middle class. This class position explains their assimilationist approach, which allows them to “maintain a sense of ethnic belonging while also benefiting from the class privileges that are firmly rooted in middle-class white America.” Not surprisingly, he adds that even while some CAIR chapters and other groups have endorsed Black Lives Matter and taken anti-racist positions, they prefer to eschew talking about race and racism altogether. Thus, they engage Islamophobia in terms of religious tolerance rather than as the racism that enables empire. … Nazia Kazi similarly highlights the class background of mainstream Muslim organizations. Her important ethnographic research shows that “without fail, Muslim sermons, panel discussions, and community events” include “a condemnation of ISIS, terrorism, or violence against civilians.” While it is not wrong to denounce such violence, to do so without a similar denunciation of the far greater violence of the United States lends itself to an acceptance of the war on terror as the appropriate way to deal with groups like ISIS. In trying to gain legitimacy in the mainstream, Kazi argues that these “good Muslims” fall into a “slippery slope” between condemning violence and “being an implicit advocate for the US ‘war on terror.’” This process validates imperial ethnocentric racism, which categorizes people as either “good” or “bad” Muslims based on their support for empire and gives credence to the war on terror. — Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire, 718 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: East Asian economic success generated a cultural self-assertion movement — Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the…, 291; A leadership model affirming difference can counter civilization-based framing of Muslims — Khaled A. Beydoun, The New Crusades_ Islamophobia and the…, 1044; Authoritarianism and preference for cultural homogeneity drive anti-Muslim stereotypes. — Carl W. Ernst, Islamophobia in America_ The Anatomy of…, 253 (+7 more)

Broader Connections