Arms control analysts equated fewer weapons with safety, ignoring stability

Evidence

Furthermore, in a counterforce war in which strategic forces are to be attacked, what is crucial is the match between the numbers and characteristics of the weapons (particularly accuracy) on the one hand and the numbers and characteristics of the targets on the other. This complex matter is not illuminated by comparing the two sides’ weapon systems themselves. One side could have more weapons, warheads, throw-weight, or even hard-target kill capability than the other yet be less able to wage a counterforce war than the adversary because the latter’s forces are more protected than the former’s. To come closer to what we want to know, we need to consider the state’s ability to locate the adversary’s forces and communicate with its own, but here again knowing—or estimating—which side is “ahead” in this regard does not tell us which side’s forces, if either, could complete their required missions. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2603 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Superior weaponry does not guarantee success in a counterforce war — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2603

Broader Connections

• Superior weaponry does not guarantee success in a counterforce war #complicates (0.75) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2603