Aristotle himself admits affection-terms for nous are only approximate

Evidence

However, this further explanation of ις only throws us back into the same difficulty. Even if we were to know henceforth that any alteration experienced by νς in so far as it submits to its own action is not in fact a corrupting /λλ ωσις, is that enough to justify us in maintaining that it is indeed acted upon? Aristotle asserts: ‘We cannot help using the incorrect terms “being acted upon or altered” of the two transitions involved as if they were the correct terms’, which implies that they were not correct, at least on initial consideration! On the other hand, any /λλ ωσις suggests motion and change (µεταλ); and Aristotle says of movement that it is ‘a certain act, although an imperfect one’. How, accordingly, is it possible to allow, except analogically or through a misinterpretation, that there is movement and change within νς? — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 415

Categorization

• QUESTION: If Aristotle self-consciously flags ‘being acted upon’ as incorrect terms, then the entire later charge that Hegel misreads Aristotle depends on deciding who may take those terms literally — worth chasing.