Aristotle conflates passivity and activity under motion as imperfect activity

Evidence

To begin with let us speak as if there were no difference between being moved or affected, and being active, for movement is a kind of activity – an imperfect kind, as has elsewhere been explained. Everything that is acted on or moved is acted upon by an agent which is actually at work. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 410

Categorization

• DEFINE: The collapsing of being-moved and being-active is precisely where plasticity’s double valence (receiving and giving form) finds its Aristotle root.
• XREF: This conflation of passivity and activity maps squarely onto the plasticity concept that the reader is tracing to their brain work. — connects to: Motion resists ontological derivation and must be accepted as a contingent fact; Motion alters a quality’s mode of being rather than its essence; Action includes tendency to motion, not just actual motion — Jeremy Bentham, The Panopticon Writings, 510 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Action includes tendency to motion, not just actual motion #expands (0.85) — Jeremy Bentham, The Panopticon Writings, 510
• Repeated external change becomes internal change through reversal of passivity into activity #expands (0.80)
• Aristotle’s power-act unity and Christian kenosis both express the subject’s plastic temporalization #expands (0.75) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 918