Aristotle adds negativity to the Idea not as change but as difference

Evidence

With Plato the affirmative principle, the Idea as only abstractly identical with itself, is the major consideration. In Aristotle there is added the moment and emphasis of negativity, but not as change nor as nullity (als Nichts), rather as difference (aber nicht als Veränderung, auch nicht als Nichts, sondern als Unterscheiden). — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 479

Categorization

• DEFINE: Charts the conceptual genealogy: Plato’s self-identical Idea gains Aristotelian difference-negativity before Hegel.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 479
• XREF: connects to: Dialectic was contradictory in meaning from its very origin between Plato and Aristotle; Hegelian negativity belongs to the Greek modality of the non-existent-that-might-be; Change, for Aristotle via Hegel, is internal differentiation rather than decay. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 498 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Change, for Aristotle via Hegel, is internal differentiation rather than decay. #expands (0.88) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 498
• Hegelian negativity belongs to the Greek modality of the non-existent-that-might-be #expands (0.85)
• Dialectic was contradictory in meaning from its very origin between Plato and Aristotle #responds-to (0.75)