Arab rulers tolerated bin Laden because offending the U.S. cost nothing

Evidence

But why would Arab governments, themselves threatened by his appeal to their subjects, show him such a remarkable degree of tolerance? Here there is a more practical consideration, involving rulers rather than subjects, and inducing them, at the very least, to take a more lenient line towards bin Laden and towards propaganda in his favor. More often than not, they confront a situation in which they have to choose between offending bin Laden and offending the U.S. In such a dilemma, the choice is not difficult. … If they offend Osama, the consequences can be very dire indeed. If they offend the U.S., they will suffer no penalties and may even—if the right people in Washington have their way—receive some reward. It therefore makes obvious good sense to do nothing against bin Laden, and even to pay him some hush money, a practice widely followed in some of the wealthier Arab countries. — Bernard Lewis, From Babel to Dragomans, 1774

Categorization

• XREF: Speaks to the instrumental toleration of Islamist actors by regimes — connects to rentier-state and regional-geopolitics literature on Saudi/Qatari sponsorship of extremism.