Aquinas reduces the love-enemy duty to readiness, not performance.

Evidence

The second interpretation performs the abstraction of enmity from the enemy, taking him quantum ad naturam. Here, the enemy is considered under the general heading of “neighbor,” proximus, and the love directed toward him is a “general kind of love,” indeed, caritas, for “this is what charity of necessity demands.” True caritas thus considers the enemy simply as one among other objects of love that include “God and his neighbor.” 101 Finally, the third interpretation points to another love beyond caritas, since it speaks of a love that “absolutely speaking, charity does not of necessity demand.” Here, Aquinas reverts to the enemy as such, but one toward whom is demanded only a specific and limited act of love, “a special act of love towards an enemy,” something that may mean loving behavior toward a particular enemy, or a particular kind of attitude, in particular circumstances, toward any potential enemy. Such an act exceeds the requirements of caritas. It is not required simply because “it is impossible.” What is, however, required, is that one prepares one’s soul, anima, “in the sense that we should be prepared to love even a particular enemy if real necessity arises.” — Gil Anidjar, The Jew, the Arab, 181

Categorization

• XREF: The final move — the obligation collapses into preparedness of the soul, not actual loving acts — echoes the trajectory of ‘On Sacrifice’ where ritual obligation similarly becomes internalized disposition rather than literal deed.