An action is defined by conscious intention, not by its effects

Evidence

If he did not know, to a certain extent, what the consequences of a certain move would be, the game would be impossible; but it would also be impossible if this foresight extended indefinitely. Plato’s definition of the philosopher as he who stands between knowing and not-knowing holds for man in general. The slightest consideration shows how every single step of our life is determined and rendered possible by the fact that we perceive its consequences, and likewise because we perceive them only up to a certain point, beyond which they become confused and finally escape our vision altogether. — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 785 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: An act must be self-present as operative intention to unify consciousness; Acts can seem intentional yet lack conscious reason at the moment; Deliberate action requires partial but not total foresight of consequences — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 785 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• An act must be self-present as operative intention to unify consciousness #corroborates (0.85)
• Acts can seem intentional yet lack conscious reason at the moment #contradicts (0.80)
• Deliberate action requires partial but not total foresight of consequences #expands (0.75) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 785
• Denying conscious control is itself a moral position of nonaccountability #expands (0.70) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 315