American concessions to Asian states were read as weakness and exploited

Evidence

Second, the United States repeatedly pursued a course of anticipated reciprocity with the Asian nations, making concessions with the expectation they would induce comparable ones from the Asians. This course was often justified by reference to the need to maintain “constructive engagement” or “dialogue” with the Asian country. More times than not, however, the Asian country interpreted the concession as a sign of American weakness and hence that it could go still further in rejecting American demands. This pattern was particularly noticeable with respect to China, which responded to the U.S. delinkage of MFN status by a new and intensive round of human rights violations. Because of the American penchant to identify “good” relations with “friendly” relations, the United States is at a considerable disadvantage in competing with Asian societies who identify “good” relations with ones that produce victories for them. To the Asians, American concessions are not to be reciprocated, they are to be exploited. — Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the…, 610

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s interest in honor/shame cultures and signaling — the asymmetry between American ‘good relations = friendly relations’ and Asian ‘good relations = victories for us’ is a signaling/framing divergence. — connects to: Vietnam and Great Society spending cost America its trade surplus and killed Bretton Woods — Yanis Varoufakis, Technofeudalism: What Killed Capitalism, 172
• SEED: An essay angle on how ‘constructive engagement’ as diplomatic framing systematically misfires across cultures that read concessions as weakness — relevant to any negotiation-as-signaling context.