Ambiguously phrased trade deals let both sides claim victory while Japan kept its policies

Evidence

Third, a pattern developed in the recurring U.S.-Japan conflicts over trade issues in which the United States would make demands on Japan and threaten sanctions if they were not met. Prolonged negotiations would ensue and then at the last moment before the sanctions were to go into effect, agreement would be announced. The agreements were generally so ambiguously phrased that the United States could claim a victory in principle, and the Japanese could implement or not implement the agreement as they wished and everything would go on as before. In similar fashion, the Chinese would reluctantly agree to statements of broad principles concerning human rights, intellectual property, or proliferation, only to interpret them very differently from the United States and continue with their previous policies. — Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the…, 611

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s interest in reputational signaling and contract ambiguity — vaguely worded agreements as face-saving devices parallel the extralegal contracting themes.