Ambiguity in trials triggers racial bias that clarity suppresses

Evidence

In terms of juror decisions, aversive racism theory predicts that ambiguous situations are more likely to evoke evidence of prejudice and bias against outgroup defendants than nonambiguous situations (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). For example, in one study researchers manipulated whether the prosecution introduced inadmissible information (incriminating for the defendant), which jurors were later told to disregard (Hodson, et al., 2005). When the inadmissible evidence was present, jurors were less likely to convict if the defendant was White than if the defendant was Black; however, in the absence of the inadmissible information, jurors displayed no out-group bias in their verdicts. — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law, 862

Categorization

• SEED: The inadmissible-evidence manipulation is a clean experimental setup worth describing in an essay on how ambiguity licenses bias.
• XREF: Connects to the general principle that moral wiggle-room or plausible deniability licenses biased behavior.