Advanced mind reading of false beliefs is probably unique to humans

Evidence

Although their work prompted a lively debate about what it is to be human, the emerging consensus is that nonhuman species are capable of only the most rudimentary types of mind reading (Penn & Povinelli, 2007). Thus, although Tarzan’s pet ape, Cheeta, was capable of basic imitation, joint attention, and even understanding immediate desires and intentions of others, it would never think that Tarzan held a false belief about the location of the nearest watering hole. More advanced forms of mind reading—recognizing that other agents may have false beliefs, form sequences of plans, or hold metacognitions about themselves or others—are probably unique to humans (Malle, 2002; Penn & Povinelli, 2007). — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 367

Tarzan’s pet ape, Cheeta, was capable of basic imitation, joint attention, and even understanding immediate desires and intentions of others, it would never think that Tarzan held a false belief about the location of the nearest watering hole. More advanced forms of mind reading-recognizing that other agents may have false beliefs, form sequences of plans, or hold metacognitions about themselves or others-are probably unique to humans (Malle, 2002; Penn & Povinelli, 2007). — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 367

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to primatology debates on theory of mind and to research on chimpanzee cognition; also ties to social cognition’s long neglect of mental-state inference.
• corroborated: 4 independent passages support this claim — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 367