Adorno treated philosophy as an independent instrument of discovery rather than applied science

Evidence

As ever, Adorno’s relationship to science was ambivalent. When he criticized science, it often remained unclear whether he really meant (a) the positivist conception of science, (b) the sciences in their existing form (whether or not this form was adequately grasped by positivist scientific theory) or (c) the individual scientific disciplines with their division of labour. On the other hand, this attitude reflected a defence of speculation, of essayistic, independent thinking which, while emphasizing conceptual discipline, was at the very least no further removed from Heidegger’s `recollection of Being’ than it was from the various methods of scientific research. In contrast to Habermas, much of Adorno’s philosophical writing neither took advantage of the results of any particular piece of scientific research, nor included any reflections on the philosophy of science. Philosophical thought became an independent instrument of discovery. — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 2508

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly distinguishes Adorno from Habermas on the science-philosophy relation — connects to the Habermas material that presumably appears elsewhere in the book. — connects to: Adorno reconceived philosophy as the teaching of the correct life rather than epistemology — Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History…, 835; Adorno chose substantive philosophy over a material theory of society — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 2528; Adorno saw philosophy as unable to grasp totality yet kept it over social theory — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 2532 (+4 more)
  • DEFINE: Clarifies the three distinct targets Adorno could mean when criticizing ‘science’ — a useful taxonomy for later reference.
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 2508

Broader Connections