A war-of-posts defense fails when the invader occupies territory instead of pursuing defenders

Evidence

With winter approaching, Howe gave up on trying to catch Washington’s elusive army in the hostile upstate and turned his troops south and west to consolidate the British position in and around New York City. “I did not think the driving their rear guard further back an object of the least consequence,” he reported to his superiors in London. Fort Washington stood in Howe’s sights, and New Jersey beckoned beyond. A war-of-posts defense works best when an invading army doggedly pursues disciplined defenders who have local support. It becomes less effective if the invaders circle back to occupy, expand, and pacify captured space. Then defenders can do little more than hold back, spread out, and strike enemy weaknesses to maintain morale. — Edward J. Larson, Declaring Independence, 261

Categorization

• XREF: This strategic logic parallels the reader’s course materials on how retreat-and-defense doctrines shape legal-political contests over contested terrain and legitimacy. — connects to: Defensive strongpoints delayed the cautious British advance — Edward J. Larson, Declaring Independence, 258; A placid, reasonless refusal defeats attempts to do battle on shared ground — Jenny Odell, How to Do Nothing: Resisting the…, 264
• QUESTION: Could the war-of-posts logic map onto how legal doctrines behave when an adverse ruling is not pursued to a decisive point?

Broader Connections

• A placid, reasonless refusal defeats attempts to do battle on shared ground #qualifies (0.75) — Jenny Odell, How to Do Nothing, 264