A thing’s causal powers change when its defining properties change.

Evidence

The causal ontological analysis of concepts cannot be divorced from the causal propositions at the basic level. The causal powers of an object or its causal liabilities (i.e., things that can happen to an object; Harré and Madden 1975) at the basic level have intimate links to the object’sontology. TotaketheliberalpeacewhichIanalyzeinchapter5, if a regime changes its nature from authoritarian to democratic then its causal powers change. To use a prosaic example, if you change the number of electrons in a copper atom you get another element with different causal powers and liabilities. — Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts, 367

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines causal liabilities as the things that can happen to an object, drawing on Harré and Madden’s powers ontology.
• XREF: The copper-electron analogy connects to philosophy-of-science essentialism (Harré, Bhaskar) and to any theory treating regime type as conferring distinct capacities.