A sub-rosa cost-benefit analysis decided only nuclear plants warranted maximum storm protection

Evidence

The subjective nature of the SPH construction is implicitly acknowledged elsewhere in the 1979 report, where the analysts recommended use of a more precautionary storm model— dubbed the “probable maximum hurricane” (PMH)— for disaster planning that occurs “in locations where high winds, waves and storm surge could pose a threat to the public health and safety from a hurricaneinduced accident at a nuclear power plant.” The availability of this PMH model prompts an obvious but unanswered question: Why not use this higher standard of protection for projects that do not involve nuclear power plants but that still concern the safeguarding of human life? More than eigh teen hundred individuals died in New Orleans and elsewhere as a result of Katrina’s effects, not to mention the thousands whose lives were irreparably damaged. Where were the impact estimations supporting the conclusion that only nuclear power plants merit the higher degree of protection afforded by the PMH? They do not exist because a subrosa costbenefi t analysis deemed them unnecessary: As one observer noted, “[t]he design of structures to provide protection against the probable maximum hurricane would, in most locations, be eco nom ical ly unjustifi ed.” — Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere, 230

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Failing to monetize human life skews flood projects toward property and development promotion — Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental…, 234; Nuclear power outcompeted solar because of military and profit advantages — Adam Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside:…, 227

Broader Connections

• Nuclear power outcompeted solar because of military and profit advantages #complicates (0.75) — Adam Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside, 227