A statutory statement-of-grounds requirement pressured an agency into developing reviewable decision criteria.

Evidence

Conceivably, the Commission might have sought to keep this as its sole guide, making ad hoc decisions on each successive application without any systematic effort to relate what it did in one case with what it did in another. But the statute required the Commission to give a hearing before denying an application and, if review were sought, to file with the court “a full statement in writing of the cts and grounds for its decision as found and given by it”. In the preparation of these statements, the Commission gradually developed, under pressure from the courts, various criteria of decision in the nature of factors to be taken into consideration. These factors do not purport to control decision and cannot because of the great variety of relevant circumstances that may by involved in competing applications. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 2907

Categorization

• ADDENDUM: Direct supporting material for the institutional theme threaded through this whole polyad reading: procedure (writing grounds) formally shaping the substance of administrative law. Fits the legal-institutions thread.
• SEED: The FCC story — broad mandate forced into articulation of criteria by the obligation to give written grounds — is a strong case study for explaining how ‘public interest’ standards acquire legal content, useful in the course.
• XREF: connects to: All official power is limited by a general prohibition against arbitrariness. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 2891; Recording reasons and evidence makes arbitrary-action review more feasible. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 2898; One statute’s administration illustrates nearly every major feature of the legal system. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1731 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Giving a reason for a decision commits one to a broader rule #expands (0.78) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 324