A state’s unequal dependence on trade can make it more conciliatory, not less.

Evidence

Barbieri (2002) assumes just the opposite when she proposes that the more constrained state in an asymmetrical relationship may well strive even harder to avoid or resolve potential conflicts. For Barbieri, it matters how much more dependent the more dependent state is. This is because a substantially more dependent state will perceive its own disadvantage in dealing with its less dependent dyadic partner and will thus moderate its behavior in order to protect its valuable trade relationship. This clearly implies some degree of substitutability since the high constraints of one actor in effect compensate for the other’s lack of constraints. Whether or not the constraints derived from trade dependence are substitutable in this way is an empirical question that deserves systematic investigation. — Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts, 951

Categorization

• SEED: Essay angle: ‘Asymmetric interdependence breeds caution, not coercion’ — the Barbieri-vs-Oneal dispute as a case study of how a single theoretical assumption silently picks your measurement instrument.