A revolutionary theory is defined by conscious rupture into two camps, not by content
Evidence
A theory is “revolutionary” precisely to the extent that it is an element of conscious separation and distinction into two camps and is a peak inaccessible to the enemy camp. To maintain that the philosophy of praxis is not a completely autonomous and independent structure of thought in antagonism to all traditional philosophies and religions, means in reality that one has not severed one’s links with the old world, if indeed one has not actually capitulated. The philosophy of praxis has no need of support from alien sources. It is sufficiently robust and rich in new truths for the old world to come to it to supply itself with a more modern and efficacious arsenal of weapons. This means that the philosophy of praxis is beginning to exercise its own hegemony over traditional culture. But traditional culture, which is still strong and above all is more polished and refined, is trying to react like Greece in defeat which finished by vanquishing its uncouth Roman conqueror. — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 1640
Categorization
- DEFINE: Defines the revolutionary attribute as an act of conscious two-camp separation rather than any intrinsic content.
- XREF: The Greece-Rome image of a conquered culture reabsorbing its conqueror connects to hegemony theory central to later Islamophobia/cultural-studies readings. — connects to: A revolutionary theory is defined by conscious separation into two camps; A theory is revolutionary by being openly antagonistic to all old thought; Revolution is the completion of the past’s dreamt thoughts, not a rupture. — Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form, 233
Broader Connections
- A revolutionary theory is defined by conscious separation into two camps
#corroborates(0.95) - A theory is revolutionary by being openly antagonistic to all old thought
#qualifies(0.80) - Revolution is the completion of the past’s dreamt thoughts, not a rupture.
#contradicts(0.75) — Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form, 233