A protest movement’s splintering makes its demands easy for rulers to ignore

Evidence

Then in October, a crowd of people from Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority gathered in front of the Maspero television building in downtown Cairo to protest the destruction of a church in Upper Egypt. SCAF forces crushed the demonstrators, killing at least twenty-four people. Government tanks rolled over their bodies, while state media blamed the protesters for inciting violence. This was the exact same type of brutality that had inspired the uprising in the first place. But the Egyptian revolutionaries only really had one arrow in their quiver: they could try to take Tahrir Square again. All types of protests took place in 2011 and 2012, but unless they forced the country to a halt, again, they remained demonstrations. Unless they could oust SCAF and replace it with a new revolutionary government, they would have to rely on negotiations and conversations until the planned elections. But the Square was splintered into a number of small groups, which made them easy to ignore. If SCAF wanted to dialogue with civil society, the Muslim Brotherhood stood out as a single coherent organization with a reliable base of support. — Vincent Bevins, If We Burn, 302

Categorization

  • XREF: Extends the ‘delaying negotiations until protest energy fades’ and ‘consensus veto’ structural critiques from ch12. — connects to: Delaying negotiations until protest energy faded let elites ignore reform — Vincent Bevins, If We Burn: The Mass Protest Decade and…, 275; Local protest movements can aggregate into a national politics without top-down coordination — Eddie S. Glaude Jr., Democracy in Black: How Race Still…, 620; Expanded protest crowds can blunt original organizers’ political messaging. — Vincent Bevins, If We Burn: The Mass Protest Decade and…, 409 (+6 more)

Broader Connections