A protection supplier becomes autonomous only by serving many independent clients

Evidence

An agent who serves only one buyer depends totally on that buyer. In an extreme case the agent may be just an employee, as the bravi were employees of the barons, and the campieri were employees of the gabelloti. Protection in this case is internalized within the buyer’s firm and kept under his control. (In the extreme case it is “internalized” in the buyer himself, who provides his own protection directly without paying for anyone else’s services.) If an agent is to become independent, the number of clients must be greater than one, and ultimately numerous enough so that no individual buyer is essential for business to succeed. It is better still if there is a variety of customers so the agent can avoid depending on any one type of buyer; his protection then becomes abstract currency, a credible commodity in more than one area. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 211

Categorization

• XREF: This concretely operationalizes the reader’s analytical frame: client diversification across types is the mechanism by which third-party enforcement detaches from any single principal — directly mapping the bravi/campieri employee status onto Gambetta’s autonomy condition.
• QUESTION: The ‘abstract currency’ metaphor invites a follow-up: is protection actually fungible across sectors the way money is, or do reputational assets degrade when exported from one domain (estate protection) to another (city rackets)?