A non-partisan third either creates direct contact or arbitrates claims between colliding parties

Evidence

A vaccaro (cattle breeder) I interviewed in Palermo succinctly expressed the core elements of the hypothesis I wish to present: “When the butcher comes to me to buy an animal, he knows that I want to cheat him. But I know that he wants to cheat me. Thus we need, say, Peppe [that is, a third party] to make us agree. And we both pay Peppe a percentage of the deal.” This statement has far-reaching theoretical consequences. There are mutual low-trust expectations generating a demand for guarantees on both sides, and there is “Peppe,” a man capable of meeting this demand and trusted by both butcher and vaccaro to be capable of doing so. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 35 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The nomination of an impartial arbitrator reveals reciprocal coordination between conflicting parties; Mutual distrust in a transaction generates demand for a third-party guarantor — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 35

Related

• Mutual distrust in a transaction generates demand for a third-party guarantor (similarity 0.88)
• Reputation alone cannot sustain honest trading without third-party registration. (similarity 0.79)
• Financial exposure tied to guarantor credibility pushes the mafia to internalize partners (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• The nomination of an impartial arbitrator reveals reciprocal coordination between conflicting parties #corroborates (0.92)
• Mutual distrust in a transaction generates demand for a third-party guarantor #exemplifies (0.88) — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 35