A genuine farewell to the other requires renouncing all assurance of return and redemption

Evidence

This renunciation, this relinquishment, this abandonment or this refusal, which would be the very condition of the ‘farewell’ addressed to the other, the condition of time and of the future to which it is exposed, is that not what, in the expression ‘to see (what is) coming’, does not only suspend the act of ‘seeing’ by a sort of internal blindness, by a sort of blinding stain or wink which while participating in the modality of the expression ‘to see (what is) coming’ and to its horizon, would regularly shut or close sight itself, from one instant to the other, by some sort of obscuration, and would stop sight itself from seeing in front of itself, would limit the horizon in order to see in front of itself, in sight of seeing in front of itself, while providing sight to sight, while procuring for sight the spectacle or the scene before which all spectacles, scenes or objects could be seen? — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 121

Categorization

• DEFINE: Derrida is redefining ‘to see coming’ (voir venir) as a modality that internally blinds sight rather than providing a horizon.
• XREF: Connects to Derrida’s wider themes of the messianic, the arrivant, and the impossible in Specters of Marx, and to Malabou’s plasticity as a middle term between openness and determinacy. — connects to: The farewell and the promise of return are indistinguishable for absolute knowledge — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 167; Trust in another’s return brackets absence and blocks existential anxiety. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 237

Broader Connections

• Trust in another’s return brackets absence and blocks existential anxiety. #contradicts (0.85) — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 237
• The farewell and the promise of return are indistinguishable for absolute knowledge #qualifies (0.82) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 167