A fourth type of plasticity mediating neuronal and experiential selves is needed

Evidence

In order to answer all the questions that I have tried to raise from the outset, it strikes me as absolutely necessary to introduce into the register of cerebral plasticity discussed in the first chapter—in addition to developmental plasticity, modulational plasticity, and reparative plasticity—a fourth type of plasticity, never as yet envisaged by neuroscientists, that would enable and qualify the formation of the singular person on the basis of the neuronal matrix. An intermediate plasticity of some kind, situated between the plasticity of the ”proto-self” and that of the conscious self. Once again, I in no way seek to contradict the thesis of the transition from the neuronal to the mental or to affirm the existence of an assumed incommensurability between one domain and the other. I do not adopt this ”antireductionist” position but rather think that a reasonable materialism should accept the necessary mediation of the idealization of self—that the position of neuronal materialism, which I adopt absolutely, should elaborate a central idea, or theory, of the transition. But this plasticity of transition, omitted from neurobiology treatises, this plasticity connecting protoplasticity to experiential plasticity, should constitute this theoretical bedrock, this idea or this idealization. ”You are your synapses”: I have nothing against this sentence. I simply want to understand the meaning of ”being” here. — Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, 228

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the proposed fourth plasticity type — ‘plasticity of transition’ or ‘intermediate plasticity’ — alongside the three established neurobiological kinds from chapter one.
• XREF: Builds directly on the three forms of plasticity canvassed in Chapter 1; also speaks to the reader’s aim of pinning down what plasticity adds beyond flexible conformity.