A dominant minority can hold power through threats and enforced coordination costs

Evidence

To illustrate, an instructive model is that of twenty men held up for robbery or ransom by a single man who has a gun and six bullets. They can overwhelm him if they are willing to lose six of themselves, if they have a means of deciding which six to lose. They can defeat him without loss if they can visibly commit themselves to a threat to do so, if they can simultaneously commit themselves to a promise to abstain from capital punishment, once they have caught him. He can deter their threat if he can visibly commit himself to shoot in disregard of any subsequent threat they might make, or if he can show that he could not believe their promise. … If the twenty cannot find a way to divide the risk, there may be no one to go first to carry out the threat, hence no way to make the threat persuasive; and if he can announce a formula for shooting, such as that those who move first get shot first, he can deter them unless they find a way to move together without a “first.” If fourteen of the twenty can overpower the remaining six and force them to advance, they can demonstrate that they could overwhelm the man; if so, the threat succeeds and the gunman surrenders, and even the six “expendables” gain through their own inability to avoid jeopardy. If the twenty could overwhelm the man but have no way of letting him escape, a promise of immunity may be necessary; but if they cannot deny their capacity to identify him and testify against him later, it may be necessary to let him take a hostage. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 287

Categorization

• XREF: Directly parallels Gambetta’s model of Mafia as private protection enforcer — the hostage mechanic here (letting the gunman take a hostage) is the same credible-commitment device Schelling maps onto the Don’s arbitration role. — connects to: Cartel enforcement power depends on a coalition of the largest families.; Gang leaders command obedience through expected mutual punishment coordination — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 188; Coercive government power depends on voluntary cooperation from many (+16 more)
• DEFINE: Specifies what makes a threat efficacious: a threat only persuades if the threatenor has visibly left himself no choice, and enforcement of internal group agreement is itself a hostage-like problem.

Related

• The State-led dominant group blocks reform in regions it only holds by domination (similarity 0.86)
• Cartel enforcement power depends on a coalition of the largest families. (similarity 0.85)

Broader Connections

• Power holders can deliberately manufacture distrust conditions to secure control #expands (0.80)
• Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties #expands (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 296
• Power suffers inflation when threats are not backed by enforcement #qualifies (0.78)
• Coercive government power depends on voluntary cooperation from many #qualifies (0.75)
• Dominance is maintained through unstable equilibria that concede some subordinate interests #qualifies (0.72)
• Politicians gain power by promising protection against imagined threats #expands (0.72) — Arsalan Iftikhar, Fear of a Muslim Planet_ Global…, 329
• Manufactured terrorist threats serve governance by keeping citizens fearful and quiescent #expands (0.72)
• A fractional commitment blends a threat with a promise #expands (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 411
• Withholding cooperation becomes power under high interdependence #complicates (0.70)
• In organizations power generates its own countervailing power. #complicates (0.70)
• Power cannot self-realize but depends on societal-structural conditions for legitimacy #qualifies (0.70)