A concept is defined by etymology as both seizing and understanding

Evidence

To ‘form a concept’ in the sense intended here means first of all to take up a concept (plasticity), which has a defined and delimited role in the philosophy of Hegel, only in order to transform it into the sort of comprehensive concept that can ‘grasp’ (saisir) the whole. Here the double sense of grasp as ‘seizing’ (prendre) and ‘understanding’ (comprendre) is authorized by the etymology of the word ‘concept’. Transforming plasticity into a concept is a matter of showing that plasticity ‘seizes’ (prend) the philosophy of Hegel and allows the reader to ‘comprehend’ it, appearing at one and the same time as a structure and as a condition of intelligibility. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 207

Categorization

• DEFINE: Unpacks the etymological sense of ‘concept’ as simultaneously ‘seizing’ (prendre) and ‘understanding’ (comprendre) — a genuinely clarifying definitional move.
• XREF: Connects to the reader’s brain-work interests: plasticity as a graspable structure, a condition of intelligibility — resonating with how she thinks about neural plasticity as both material structure and condition for understanding. — connects to: The concept is a formative power, not an empty receptacle — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 208; Concepts function as abbreviations compressing infinite particularity. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 1023